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Climate change and energy policies are increasingly becoming dominant 
issues in European policymaking, and public awareness of what is at stake 
has never been more pronounced. This constitutes a great opportunity for 
action. The time has come for the EU to embark on a coherent internal and 
external strategy shift. Five specific requirements are to be met. 
 
 
 
 
Energy Provision  
Difficulties 
In the past Western economic success was to a 
large extent based on unimpeded access to 
relatively inexpensive fossil fuels. This is no 
longer the case. For a whole host of reasons 
Europe must in future pursue a different kind 
of energy policy: 
 
• The demand for oil and gas has reached the 
point where it exceeds the increasingly scarce 
supply. The global economic upturn, coupled 
with a swift upsurge in demand from China 
and India, has driven oil and gas prices to 
record levels. A barrel of oil currently costs 
about US$ 70. In 1990 the price per barrel 
was still as low as US$ 20.  
Whereas wealthy countries can still pay these 
prices, developing countries cannot. Certain 
states in Africa spend more than half of their 
small GDPs on energy. This money is available 
neither for the construction of urgently needed 
infrastructure, nor for education, nor for health 
care. High energy prices make it impossible to 
close the development gap, and as a result the 
early integration of certain countries into the 
global economy seems more and more 
unlikely. 
 
• Fossil fuels are finite. Estimates suggest that 
in the case of oil the maximum production 
levels have already been reached. The proven 
reserves in the case of crude oil amount to 
1,292.936 billion barrels and in the case of gas 
to 176,389.66 trillion cubic metres.  At current 
energy consumption levels these resources 
will last until 2040 (oil) or 2060 (gas).  
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The high oil and gas prices make it 
increasingly profitable to drill in remote areas 
and to use ever more sophisticated technology. 
However, the expansion of production areas 
c a n  a t  b e s t  d o  n o  m o r e  t h a n  t o  d e f e r  t h e  
inevitable to a later date. And it has far-
reaching consequences. A foretaste of what is 
to come is the recent race for the Arctic. Some 
people may simply find it amusing that, as in 
the days of the Klondike gold rush, Russia is 
trying to stake out its claims by placing a 
titanium flag on the seabed. They will be 
brought back to earth with a jolt as soon as 
international relations begin to be marred by 
new conflicts emanating from claims to 
sovereignty over the continental shelf. 
 
• Oil and gas belong to a minority.  The 
reserves are so unevenly distributed that the 
v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  s t a t e s  h a v e  t o  i m p o r t  t h e s e  
r e s o u r c e s .  T h e  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  i m p o r t  5 7  
per cent of the natural gas and 82 per cent of 
the oil they consume. The U.S., the world’s 
largest consumer of energy, imports about 700 
million tons of oil, followed by Europe, which 
imports 650 million tons. Moreover, China’s 
hunger for energy is so great that it is now the 
second-largest consumer of energy. Its oil 
consumption currently amounts to about 200 
million tons.  
 
It is more and more likely that there will be 
distribution struggles to secure ever scarcer 
resources. International standards which have 
been established with a great deal of difficulty 
are simply being ignored. For example, China, 
in its energy and Africa policies, is not 
interested in whether or not Sudan is 
trampling on human rights. It is simply 
concerned to secure an exclusive share of the 
local energy cake. 
 
• The energy-producing countries either 
subscribe to democracy and the market 
economy in a lukewarm manner, or not at all. 
This makes the dependence of the consumer 
states even more problematical. Thus the 
world’s largest oil reserves are located in the 
Middle East  one of most unstable and conflict-
ridden regions on earth. It is an area where a 
disruption of oil supplies could occur at any 
time.  
 
Another problem is the fact that in many 
energy-producing countries, the energy 
corporations are often state-owned entities. 
Their decisions are not only dictated by 
market forces. When Gazprom recently 
stopped supplies reaching Ukraine, Belarus 
and Georgia, the issue was not only higher gas 
prices. It was also a new way of expressing 
Russian self-confidence. Gas had become a 
way of exerting political pressure. 
 
“Problematic: Energy  
Corporations are often 
state-owned entities” 
 
• Sourcing energy from coal, oil and gas 
exacerbates climate change. Ever since the 
publication of the British Stern Review, the 
misguided energy policies of the industrialized 
states, which are now being repeated in a 
disastrous manner in the booming areas of 
Asia, have had a price tag put on them. It is 
estimated that it will cost up to 20% of global 
GDP unless decisive action is taken soon to 
reverse the trend. 
 
Climate change contains the seeds of new 
tensions and conflicts. Persistent drought and 
the concomitant increase in flooding will 
increase migratory pressure from Africa (and 
from parts of Asia) to Europe. Conflicts about 
water are a foregone conclusion in the Middle 
East. The decrease in the available arable land 
and the concomitant growth of the global 
population is leading to another set of 
potential conflicts. The consequences of this as 
far as Europe is concerned are still difficult to 
assess. 
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REQUIREMENT I 
Separating growth and 
energy consumption  
The problems associated with energy 
consumption cannot be solved on a national 
level. States which are trying to do this will get 
nowhere. Similarly, the diversification of 
energy supplies cannot solve the problem 
either, since it is ineffective with regard to the 
crucial points. Oil and gas are finite resources 
which more and more countries wish to 
procure. 
 
Since the Europeans do not wish to (and in 
fact cannot) exclude other regions from growth 
and modernization in order to protect finite 
energy resources and the global climate, they 
will have to do three things. First, they must 
do what they can to ensure that in the 
booming industrial areas, especially in Asia, 
economic growth is separated step by step 
from energy consumption. Secondly, they 
must help to lay the foundations for a new 
energy-friendly and environmentally friendly 
economic policy in the developing areas in 
Africa, so that the mistakes of their own 
industrialization are not repeated. And thirdly, 
the Europeans themselves must display 
greater determination with regard to the 
ongoing separation of growth and energy 
consumption by instituting a common and 
goal-oriented EU research and energy policy. 
 
In the case of the third step in particular the 
potential is enormous. It reaches from the 
greater use of cogeneration (combined heat 
and power) to improved insulation, energy-
saving electrical devices, and internal combus-
tion engines with direct injection to the devel-
opment and greater utilization of renewable 
energy sources.  
 
Energy saving and energy efficiency are 
virtually unknown in the energy-producing 
states. Oil and gas have hitherto been wasted 
because the prices have been lower than those 
on the global market. In Russia, for example, 
this means that there is clearly less room for 
manoeuvre when it comes to profiting from 
increasing internal and external demand. With 
the technical expertise at its disposal, the EU 
would make an ideal partner, and would thus 
be performing a responsible task.  
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REQUIREMENT II 
Restructuring the EU 
budget 
The EU could do much more than this. By 
lowering and reallocating agricultural 
subsidies, it would acquire formidable 
financial resources with which to fund its 
research policy, and it would continue to be a 
global leader in the development of alternative 
sources of energy. In this way it could in 
future provide European industry with some 
outstanding opportunities. This is especially 
true of the development of hydrogen-based 
technology. This is currently being tested in 
the ITER fusion research reactor in Cadarache 
in France. On the other hand, hydrogen motors 
and the hydrogen/oxygen fuel cell constitute 
two potential ways of shifting away from the 
fossil fuel economy. 
 
The financial resources no longer assigned to 
the agricultural budget could help the member 
states to implement agreed European climate 
change targets. For example, they could be 
used to fund measures designed to increase 
energy efficiency, and for alternative energy 
projects. Is there any reason why the profound 
solidarity displayed for decades by the 
member states in order to stabilize the 
agricultural sector should not be in evidence 
in future when it comes to securing our energy 
supplies? 
 
As the most important donor of development 
aid, the EU can also insist on the implemen-
tation of climate change measures and the 
need for energy security in the developing 
countries. At present development cooperation 
is already subject to a set of specific 
conditions. Aid is increasingly being tied to 
compliance with certain norms. It is no doubt 
important to insist on respect for human rights 
and good governance. However, it would be 
equally important in the case of subsidized 
infrastructure projects to discuss the intro-
duction of energy security and climate change 
measures. The EU Energy Initiative for Poverty 
Eradication and Sustainable Development thus 
merely constitutes a starting point which 
needs to be followed up by other steps. 
Subsidizing alternative energy projects in 
such countries would also be of benefit to 
European industry. 
 
REQUIREMENT III 
Creating European  
standards 
At the Brussels summit in June 2007 the EU 
made far-reaching decisions relating to its fu-
ture climate change and energy policies. It is 
of crucial importance for the EU to define 
common standards for more energy efficiency 
as soon as possible. An Action Plan devoted to 
this subject will first be finalized early in 
2010. However, manufacturers need uniform 
regulations in order to develop new energy-
saving and climate-friendly technologies with-
out undue delay. In order to acquire this busi-
ness, the EU must create the requisite precon-
ditions in the internal market. Manufacturers 
also need clear-cut guidelines. Why not think 
about an EU-wide tempo limit, or defined per-
missible carbon dioxide emissions from motor 
vehicles? 
 
If the EU were to reach agreement on common 
standards, there is a good chance that these 
could then be introduced on the international 
level. The world’s manufacturers take their 
cue from Europe’s purchasing power. If it is 
possible to stop the import of potentially 
h a r m f u l  t o y s  f r o m  C h i n a ,  i t  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  
possible to insist on high energy-saving norms 
for imported electrical devices. A German ban 
on stand-by functions would make it possible 
to shut down a medium-sized power station. 
 
Every technology which helps to save energy 
will also be of vital significance for China and 
India in the near future. At present the two 
countries may not yet be prepared to embark 
on a change of direction, since it might harm 
their economies. In China a sudden end to 
growth could well lead to a situation where the 
whole political system is called into question. 
However, high oil and gas prices and the popu-
lation’s growing demand for a higher standard  
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of living will soon make it imperative to steer 
in a different direction. 
 
 REQUIREMENT IV 
Unanimity and market  
liberalization 
Despite public pronouncements to the 
contrary, there is little unanimity in the EU 
when it comes to energy issues. This 
engenders a credibility gap, since the member 
states still tend to approach energy problems 
on the basis of the idea that charity begins at 
home. It is difficult to interpret in any other 
way the various agreements concerning 
pipelines and gas supplies concluded in the 
recent past by Germany and Russia, or 
Hungary and Italy and Russia. They have often 
been to the detriment of other member states, 
have jeopardized certain European norms, or 
constituted a threat to joint EU projects such 
as the Nabucco pipeline. The sale of a French 
nuclear power plant to Libya should also be 
seen in this context. 
 
For this reason the EU should proceed to liber-
alize its own energy market, even in the face 
of increasing internal resistance. Here the 
European Commission deserves all the sup-
port it can get. The internal market also needs 
to be opened up for foreign direct investment.  
 
If European markets are opened up for foreign 
investors, the introduction of golden shares 
could alleviate anxieties about allowing key 
European industries to pass into the hands of 
problematical state-owned entities. However, 
energy security cannot be improved by exclud-
ing producers of natural resources from sup-
ply networks and retail activities. 
 
REQUIREMENT V 
International energy  
management 
By setting a good example with its standards 
and a liberalized energy market, the EU will 
gain credibility and negotiating clout. In the 
forthcoming negotiations on a Kyoto protocol 
follow-up agreement on the reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions it will need both in 
order to convince other states that its climate 
policy goals are not a Trojan horse. Past 
attempts to make progress in this area have 
come to grief primarily as a result of the 
suspicions harboured by the developing 
countries, which fear that the West’s climate 
change policy merely exists to give it a one-
sided competitive advantage and to exclude 
the rest of the world from growth and 
progress. 
 
Yet the EU will also find credibility useful in 
its dealings with energy-producing countries. 
If it wishes to avert the looming energy crisis, 
it must encourage producers and give them 
the feeling that it makes sense to proceed with 
new investments. Estimates suggest that by 
the year 2030 the global use of fossil fuels will 
have increased by about 85 per cent. The 
investments needed for the discovery and 
exploitation of new oil and gas reserves and 
the associated transportation systems amount 
to US $ 20 trillion. Few of the countries with 
natural resources would be prepared to 
embark on investments of this magnitude if 
European consumers were  to give them the 
feeling that they were primarily on the look-
out for alternatives in order to diversify or 
reduce their energy requirements.  
 
Strategic partnerships between the EU and the 
energy-producing countries are an excellent 
way of achieving greater transparency and of 
promoting confidence-building between the 
players–as long as they are based on 
multilateral agreements, and not on bilateral 
ones. Otherwise, as the agreements of certain 
EU member states with Russia demonstrate, 
there will be a danger that a familiar pattern of 
protecting power and interests will reappear. 
However, in the past this has tended to 
exacerbate conflicts and not to reduce them. In 
the final analysis exclusive EU relations with 
Russia or Central Asia cannot prevent other 
countries from entering into such exclusive 
relationships. But does Europe really want 
China to establish an energy partnership of 
this kind with Iran and Pakistan? 
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In order to prevent zero sum games between 
new energy blocs, relations between producers 
and consumers should thus be placed on a 
completely new multilateral basis. What is 
needed is a kind of energy management that is 
both international and co-operational. This 
may seem like a tall order. However, there is 
no time like the present, and no one is more 
suited to making such a move with a certain 
amount of credibility than the EU. Its creden-
tials are impeccable. In the final analysis its 
own history constitutes the best example of 
the fact that economic success is possible on 
the basis of binding legal regulations. 
 
Such a regime is also long overdue when it 
comes to confidence-building between 
consumers. It might be a way of toning down 
the global competition for finite resources, 
and, in the event of an energy crisis, it could 
reduce the tension in the markets and in 
international relations.  
 
“Does the EU really want 
China to establish an  
energy partnership with 
Iran and Pakistan?” 
 
However, there is still no framework within 
which the OECD states and the developing 
countries can discuss these issues. The 
members of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), contrary to what the name suggests, are 
largely the same as those of the OECD. The 
IEA was founded as a consumer’s association 
after the first oil price shock in 1974, and has 
had no more than mixed success. When there 
have been shortages and sudden price hikes, it 
has proved possible only to a certain extent to 
persuade members to refrain from 
exacerbating the crisis by engaging in panic 
buying. Furthermore, the question arises of 
whether in future the IEA’s strategic oil 
reserves will be sufficient if India and China, 
whenever there are shortages, will buy 
anything they can lay their hands on. 
 
The EU should do everything it can to 
incorporate China, India and other Asian 
countries into a common system. These states 
must be convinced that, with regard to the 
distribution of energy in a time of crisis, their 
interests will be taken into account in an 
appropriate manner. The Energy Charter 
treaty, which was launched in 1991 as an EU 
initiative, could form the basis for further 
action in conjunction with aspects of the 
International Energy Agency. 
  
In the final analysis most countries wish to see 
functioning energy markets, an end to 
distorted competition, information security 
and secure delivery routes, and, last but not 
least, the development of alternative energy 
sources. 
 
 
Seizing the opportunity 
If energy security signifies the establishment 
of an atmosphere of trust between producers 
and consumers and among consumers them-
selves, then the EU seems to be predestined 
for the task. In practice the goal has not yet 
been attained. If it were to materialize, it could 
provide a global model for a path leading to 
the separation of economic growth and energy 
consumption. 
 
There are positive signs that a coherent Euro-
pean energy policy of this kind is beginning to 
emerge. The European electorate has never 
been more receptive to the subject of climate 
change. Since climate change and energy poli-
cies are merely two sides of one coin, any pol-
icy designed to deal with climate change also 
makes a contribution to energy security. It re-
duces the tensions which derive from the pau-
city of energy resources. And at the same time 
it also ensures that there are no new tensions 
as a result of climate change. 
 
Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for a project 
on the scale of a World Energy Agency. How-
ever, the EU should do whatever it can with 
the resources at its disposal and should sup-
port convincing and effective multilateral solu-
tions in all the international and regional fo-
rums. There is a need for political foresight - 
that is what EU citizens expect.  
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